An independent and consistent approach of EU toward China serves interests of both sides and the broader world

Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez has been visiting China from April 11 to 15, his fourth trip since 2023. Last November, King Felipe VI of Spain visited Beijing. Since then, leaders from France, Finland, the United Kingdom and Germany have followed suit. This wave of high-level exchanges signals a broader recalibration of European policy toward China amid rapidly shifting geopolitical dynamics.

Today's Europe finds itself in an increasingly complex strategic environment — not only entangled in the protracted Ukraine crisis but also navigating growing political friction with the United States.

For decades, the transatlantic partnership has underpinned Europe's prosperity and security. However, since Donald Trump's return to the White House in January 2025, tensions have flared over trade, NATO burden-sharing, the Ukraine crisis and the frictions over Greenland. More recently, US-led military actions targeting Iran have triggered great unease across European capitals. Spain's decision to deny the use of its territory and airspace for such operations underscores the widening divisions within the transatlantic alliance.

A deeper shift is underway. The transatlantic relationship — once rooted in shared values — now shows signs of growing divergence in political priorities. The US National Security Strategy released last December, which warned of "civilizational erasure" in Europe, laid bare the widening gap. Mutual trust is eroding, and the notion of "like-minded allies" is increasingly untenable.

The Ukraine crisis continues to weigh heavily on Europe. A recent survey by the European Union Institute for Security Studies and the European University Institute described Europe's security outlook as "rather bleak and uncertain", with the Ukraine crisis and uncertainty over US security guarantees ranking among the top risks for 2026.

It is against this backdrop that Europe is rethinking its China policy.

Since 2019, the EU's characterization of China as simultaneously a "partner, competitor and systemic rival" has contributed to strained ties.

Yet amid a deteriorating geopolitical environment, many European countries have begun to reassess their approach to China. Tentative signs of stabilization have emerged. China and the EU lifted restrictions on parliamentary exchanges last May. Alongside a series of visits by European leaders, a European Parliament delegation traveled to China this year for the first time in eight years — an indication that dialogue is normalizing and political trust is being rebuilt.

Economic ties, meanwhile, are showing renewed strength. Despite the EU's "de-risking" strategy and tighter regulatory scrutiny, bilateral trade and investment have shown resilience. In 2025, trade in goods between China and the EU reached approximately 760 billion euros ($888.4 billion), with both sides remaining among each other's major trading partners. Data compiled for Reuters show that German investment in China rebounded to over 7 billion euros last year — the highest level since 2021 — while Chinese investment in Europe continued to grow, reaching 9.4 billion euros in 2024 and sustaining momentum into 2025.

At the same time, disputes persist. Concerns within Europe over its industrial competitiveness and economic security have led to calls for a tougher approach toward China. Recent EU initiatives — including revisions to the Cybersecurity Act and the proposed Industrial Accelerator Act — aim to exclude so-called high-risk suppliers from key sectors such as 5G and semiconductors, while imposing stringent conditions on areas including batteries, electric vehicles and photovoltaics. It is understood that Chinese investors enjoy convincing strengths in these areas.

China-Europe relations thus stand at a complex juncture, marked by both renewed engagement and structural tensions. The key question is whether the current momentum can be translated into a more stable and sustainable framework for cooperation.

For the EU, a necessary starting point is to develop a more balanced and objective understanding of China. In recent years, European policy debates over China have been heavily shaped by concepts such as "economic security". These notions are difficult to define with precision, and an overly securitized perspective risks distorting perceptions and narrowing the range of available policy options.

China has consistently viewed a prosperous Europe as a partner, not a challenger. For Europe, strengthening its competitiveness and security does not have to preclude cooperation or complementarity; in many areas, it may in fact depend on them.

For example, China's 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-30) signals a continued commitment to high-level opening-up, particularly in services, alongside efforts to boost domestic consumption and improve the business environment. These policies are expected to create new opportunities for European businesses. At the same time, European expertise can help China tackle its challenges, including demographic pressures and environmental constraints.

More concrete steps can also be taken. For example, while China has introduced visa-free policies for many European states, reciprocal facilitation on the European side would help strengthen mutual understanding and public support for the relationship. In development and humanitarian assistance, joint efforts could contribute more effectively to poverty reduction and crisis response in the Global South. In the digital domain, the recently established World Data Organization in Beijing may offer new avenues for dialogue and cooperation on rule-making.

In an era of geopolitical uncertainty, a stable and sustainable China-Europe relationship serves not only the interests of both sides but also the broader international community. The visit of the Spanish prime minister and the recent uptick in high-level exchanges offer grounds for cautious optimism. Yet for the relationship to achieve lasting stability and prosperity, Europe will need to develop a more independent and consistent approach toward China — one guided by its own strategic priorities rather than reactive adjustments to external pressures.

The author is an associate professor and the acting director of the Department of International Relations at the Institute of European Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

The author contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.