Yet the remaining issues to be negotiated are tough ones: which sectors will be included in each country’s negative list, which exceptions from the general non-discrimination principles will be permitted, how the BIT will be enforced at the sub-national level, and how the dispute settlement mechanisms will be structured. But we are confident that these issues can be resolved.

This should be a very high priority for both governments. Mutual economic benefit is there to be gained provided that the protections of a BIT are in place. Such a treaty is in both countries’ interests for broader reasons as well. An agreement that opens China’s economy further to foreign investment would help to implement China’s economic reforms aimed at moving it from an export-oriented manufacturing economy to a more balanced economy based on domestic consumption. A treaty that further encourages Chinese FDI in the US would help to infuse capital into the American economy and spur much-needed economic growth.

We do not underestimate the difficulties of reaching a final agreement. But the WTO talks, which covered a vastly larger set of legal obligations, were harder still. Then, as now, there was significant political reluctance in each country to closing the deal—pressure that was overcome by strong leaders who saw the benefits for each country, who stood their ground on core matters that could not be compromised but found enough common ground to achieve a landmark agreement.

Those leaders were right, as history shows. WTO accession has produced great benefits for both China and the US and global trade in general. A BIT will expand upon those benefits in real and immediate ways. We urge the current US and Chinese leadership and negotiators to seize the opportunities at hand as creatively and quickly as possible to conclude an agreement in the best interests of both countries.

Ms Barshefsky served as US Trade Representatie from 1997-2001.

Mr Long served as China’s chief WTO negotiator from 1994-2001.